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769 
‘DERIVING’ AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICABILITY OF 
THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 
GABRIELLE SCHWARTZ† 
INTRODUCTION 
“[H]ad Loginovskaya resided on Main Street, U.S.A. or Sutton 
Place, New York rather than in Surgut, Russia at the time she 
made her investments, we all agree that her suit would have 
been allowed to proceed[.]”1 
Every single day, individual investors are defrauded in the 
derivatives marketplace.  Should an individual be able to pursue 
a claim against the fraudster?  Absolutely.  Unfortunately, 
confusion has diluted this seemingly obvious “yes” over time, 
ultimately barring individuals like Ludmila Loginovskaya, a 
Russian citizen, from pursuing a cause of action in the Southern 
District of New York against a domestic commodity broker. 
Derivative markets have existed for centuries, but were not 
widely followed until the late 2000s.  In the early 1930s, the 
Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) was enacted to regulate 
commodities, such as wheat, corn, and potatoes, and other 
agricultural futures contracts.2  These are the products that 
continue to come to mind for most people when they think about 
what the Act must regulate today.  However, the derivatives 
marketplace has expanded vastly and rapidly over time, and the 
Act also regulates major financial instruments, including credit, 
currency, and interest rate swaps. 
 
 
† Notes & Comments Editor, St. John’s Law Review; J.D. Candidate, 2018, St. 
John’s University School of Law; B.A., 2014, University of Delaware.  
1 Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko (Loginovskaya II), 764 F.3d 266, 276 (2d Cir. 
2014) (Lohier, J., dissenting). 
2 History of the CFTC: US Futures Trading and Regulation Before the Creation 
of the CFTC, U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, http://www.cftc.gov/Ab 
out/HistoryoftheCFTC/history_precftc (last visited Dec. 23, 2017). 
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It was not until the Financial Crisis of 2008 that individuals, 
governments, and industry experts alike realized the magnitude 
and significance of the derivatives market and the damage that 
could be done if it was not responsibly regulated.  While the 
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”) closed many of these 
market loopholes, questions remain regarding the extent to 
which extraterritorial jurisdiction exists over claims related to 
commodities and other derivative products that are subject to the 
CEA, and who is permitted to assert such a claim. 
This Note argues that courts should return to using a holistic 
approach, similar to the traditional “conducts” and “effects” test 
previously used by courts to analyze extraterritorial securities 
and commodities claims, to assess claims brought under the 
CEA.  Furthermore, this Note argues that both the Commodity 
Futures Trading Commission and private individuals including 
foreign plaintiffs, should be permitted to bring these claims to 
uphold Congress’s intent in establishing a regulatory regime and 
maintaining the integrity of the international derivatives 
market.  Part I discusses the history of derivative regulation and 
how both court decisions and statutory changes have created the 
potential for confusion when asserting causes of action in the 
commodities context. Fueling this confusion, one Supreme Court 
case in particular, Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., 
held that the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
applicable in Rule 10b-5 cases, and eliminated the used of the 
“conducts” and “effects” test to assess these extraterritorial 
claims.  Part II uses recent case law, specifically a case out of the 
Second Circuit, Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, to illustrate the 
problems and inconsistencies with extending the Morrison 
decision to commodity and derivative fraud claims under the 
CEA in a post-Dodd-Frank world.  Part III.A argues that courts 
should return to using a holistic, fact-specific approach, rather 
than Morrison’s transactional test, when evaluating 
extraterritorial jurisdiction in commodity and derivative fraud 
cases.  Part III.B argues that, consistent with the use of a holistic 
test outlined in Part III.A, foreign plaintiffs should continue to be 
afforded private rights of action for commodity and derivative 
fraud or manipulation suits in U.S. courts.  Lastly, Part III.C  
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addresses the steps that courts must take to correct or address 
policy misstatements when presented with these claims in the 
future. 
I. THE EVOLVING REGULATION OF THE DERIVATIVES 
MARKETPLACE AND THE EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE 
CEA 
A. Understanding Derivatives and Their Role in the 2008 
Financial Crisis 
A derivative is a contract between two parties whose value is 
derived from an asset’s underlying price and performance.3  “The 
value of derivatives is derived from the performance of an asset, 
index, interest rate, commodity or currency.”4  Derivatives have 
existed since ancient times,5 and can be broken down into four 
major categories: forwards, futures, options, and swaps.6  Swaps 
come in many varieties, but since the passage of Dodd-Frank in 
2010, swaps have been more specifically defined in both the CEA 
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.7  As currently defined 
in the CEA, a swap could be any transaction that is not settled by 
delivery of the underlying commodity, including, but not limited 
to (1) options, such as puts, calls, caps, and floors on most 
reference assets; (2) swaps, such as those on interest rates, 
broad-based securities indices, and other reference assets; 
(3) credit default swaps; (4) any other instrument “that is 
or . . . becomes commonly known . . . as a swap”; (5) foreign 
 
3 Steven Nickolas, What Is the Difference Between Derivatives and Swaps?, 
INVESTOPEDIA (June 2, 2015, 1:21 PM), http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/0 
60215/what-difference-between-derivatives-and-swaps.asp. 
4 Id. (emphasis added). 
5 GARY E. KALBAUGH, DERIVATIVES LAW AND REGULATION 25 (2014) (“ ‘There is 
the anecdote of Thales the Milesian and his financial device . . . . According to the 
story, he knew by his skill in the stars while it was yet winter that there would be a 
great harvest of olives in the coming year; so, having a little money, he gave deposits 
for the use of all the olive-presses in Chios and Miletus, which he hired at a low price 
because no one bid against him. When the harvest-time came, and many were 
wanted all at once and of a sudden, he let them out at any rate which he pleased, 
and made a quantity of money. . . .’ Thales, by buying the future right to the use the 
olive presses, entered into an economic derivative, a futures contract.” (quoting 
ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, BOOK 1)). 
6 HECTOR COLON, NAT’L CTR. FOR POLICY ANALYSIS, THE ROLE OF DERIVATIVES 
IN THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 2 (2016), http://www.ncpa.org/pdfs/ib187.pdf. 
7 See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012). 
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exchange swaps and foreign exchange forward contracts; and 
(6) any instrument that combines any of the above.8  The 
definition of swap excludes futures and most forward contracts. 
Until 2010, the swaps market was “completely lacking in 
transparency, and virtually unregulated,” as described by former 
SEC Chairman Christopher Cox.9  Major financial institutions 
“were using credit default swaps . . . as a means of ‘insuring’ 
against some of their overly risky subprime business practices.”10  
Swaps, like securities and other derivative products, have 
generally been traded in “over-the-counter” (“OTC”) markets.11  
OTC derivatives are traded by large financial institutions, 
traditionally banks, holding companies and investment banks, 
which act as derivatives dealers, buying and selling contracts 
with customers.12  Unlike the futures, options and national 
securities exchanges, the OTC market is neither centralized nor 
regulated, nor is it transparent, and thus price discovery is 
limited.13  OTC markets let derivatives traders, including the 
large investment banks, increase their leverage—a double-edged 
sword in terms of risk and reward.14  “While up until the mid-
2000s, derivatives were ‘generally regarded as a beneficial 
financial innovation that distributed financial risk more 
efficiently and made the financial system more stable, resilient, 
and resistant to shock . . . [t]he [financial] crisis essentially 
 
8 See id.; see also Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP to Clients 
on CFTC and SEC Adopt Definition of “Swap” and “Security-Based Swap” 5 (Aug. 
23, 2012), http://www.willkie.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2012/08/CFTC%20and 
%20SEC%20Adopt%20Definition%20of%20Swap%20and%20Securi__/Files/CFTCan
dSECAdoptDefinitionofSwap1pdfFileAttachment/CFTC_and_SEC_Adopt_Definition
_of_Swap1.pdf. 
9 Christopher Cox, Chairman, Sec. Exch. Comm’n, Opening Remarks at SEC 
Roundtable on Modernizing the Securities and Exchange Commission's Disclosure 
System (Oct. 8, 2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2008/spch100808cc.htm. 
10 See Jonathan Lindenfeld, The CFTC’s Substituted Compliance Approach: An 
Attempt To Bring About Global Harmony and Stability in the Derivatives Market, 14 
J. INT’L BUS. & L. 125, 127 (2015). 
11 See id. at 128. 
12 Id. at 128–29. 
13 Id. 
14 THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL 
AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 43 (2011), http://fcic-static.law.stan 
ford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/fcic_final_report_full.pdf. 
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reversed this view.’ ”15  In the aftermath of the 2008 Financial 
Crisis, Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan 
testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee (“FCIC”), 
a ten-member, government-appointed committee tasked with 
investigating the cause of the financial crisis, that credit default 
swaps created problems during the financial crisis.16  
Furthermore, Former Treasury Secretary Larry Summers stated 
to the FCIC that “while risks could not necessarily have been 
foreseen years ago, ‘by 2008 our regulatory framework with 
respect to derivatives was manifestly inadequate’ and that ‘the 
derivatives that proved to be by far the most serious, those 
associated with credit default swaps, increased 100 fold between 
2000 and 2008.’ ”17  However, this increase was built on a faulty 
presumption of success.  While the worldwide value of the 
underlying assets for credit default swaps grew to $58.2 trillion 
at the end of 2007, “[a] significant portion was . . . speculative or 
naked credit default swaps.”18  In the aftermath of the crisis, it 
was easy to see that derivatives helped create a perfect storm for 
systematic failure.19 
B. Dodd-Frank Changes the CEA by Adding Provisions That 
Specifically Address the Extent of the CFTC’s Jurisdiction 
over Extraterritorial Activities 
In order to patch market loopholes and address the greatest 
financial collapse in modern history, Congress enacted Dodd-
Frank “[t]o promote the financial stability of the United States by 
improving accountability and transparency in the financial 
system.”20  More specifically, Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
 
15 Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass'n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 385–86 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Inv. Co. Inst. v. U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n, 891 F. Supp. 2d 162, 173 (D.D.C. 2012). 
16 THE FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, supra note 14, at 48–49. 
17 Id. at 49. 
18 Id. at 50. 
19 See id. at 51; id. at 352 (“AIG’s failure was possible because of the sweeping 
deregulation of over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, including credit default swaps, 
which effectively eliminated federal and state regulation of these products, including 
capital and margin requirements that would have lessened the likelihood of AIG’s 
failure. The OTC derivatives market’s lack of transparency and of effective price 
discovery exacerbated the collateral disputes of AIG and Goldman Sachs and similar 
disputes between other derivatives counterparties.”). 
20 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1376 (2010). 
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known as the Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act 
of 2010,21 imposed a comprehensive and far-reaching regulatory 
regime on derivatives and market participants and mandated the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) to engage in new 
rulemaking.22  Under Dodd-Frank, the CFTC was tasked with 
implementing four goals: “(1) clearing of standardized swaps 
through central counterparties or clearinghouses; (2) trading of 
swaps on transparent, regulated platforms; (3) oversight of swap 
dealers and major swap participants; and (4) reporting of data on 
the swaps market to facilitate greater transparency and enhance 
regulatory oversight.”23 
To address and achieve these goals, § 722 of Dodd-Frank 
explicitly granted jurisdiction over swaps to the CFTC,24 and also 
created a new § 2(i) of the CEA, which states that provisions of 
Dodd-Frank “shall not apply to activities outside the United 
States unless those activities have a direct and significant 
connection with activities in, or effect on, commerce of the United 
States . . . .”25 
The CEA has several different provisions that address 
jurisdiction and govern who may bring a cause of action.  “The 
CEA is a ‘remedial statute that serves the crucial purpose of 
protecting the innocent individual investor—who may know little 
about the intricacies and complexities of the commodities 
market—from being misled or deceived.’ ”26  Section 2 of the CEA 
confers exclusive jurisdiction to the CFTC, but does not 
“supersede or limit the jurisdiction conferred on courts of the 
United States . . . .”27  The Act also affords rights to individuals.  
 
21 Id. at 1641 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 8301 (2012)). 
22 MORRISON & FOERSTER, THE DODD-FRANK ACT: A CHEAT SHEET 3 (2010), 
http://media.mofo.com/files/uploads/Images/SummaryDoddFrankAct.pdf. 
23 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: FISCAL 
YEAR 2017, at 2 (2016), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@newsroom/documents 
/file/cftcbudget2017.pdf. 
24 See Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1) (2012); see also Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, § 722(a)(2) (2012) (reserving 
jurisdiction over “security-based swaps” for the SEC). 
25 7 U.S.C.A § 2(i)(1)–(2) (West 2015). 
26 Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Commodity 
Futures Trading Comm’n v. R.J. Fitzgerald & Co., 310 F.3d 1321, 1329 (11th Cir. 
2002)). 
27 7 U.S.C.A § 2(a)(1)(A) (West 2015). 
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Section 25 affords a private right of action to individuals,28 and in 
addition to bringing a cause of action in court, “[a]n aggrieved 
party otherwise may seek recovery through an administrative 
proceeding at the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.”29  
However, the sheer magnitude and expanse of the OTC 
derivatives market means that identifying, regulating, and 
policing all trades is virtually impossible, making the need for 
private rights of action readily apparent.  While the CEA is said 
to afford rights to both the agency and the individual against a 
defendant broker, how are courts to determine whether there is 
proper jurisdiction over the claim itself, particularly if the alleged 
fraud took place outside of the United States or if the aggrieved 
party is not a U.S. citizen? 
C. Methods for Assessing Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Over 
Commodity Fraud Claims 
1. “Conducts” and “Effects” Test 
For decades, courts used a fact-specific “conducts” and 
“effects” test to assess the extraterritorial applicability of the 
CEA.30  For example, in Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc.,31 the 
Second Circuit held that the Southern District had subject 
matter jurisdiction to hear a CEA claim brought by a Greek 
citizen and resident against a U.S. commodity broker, even 
though the transaction was executed through the defendant’s 
Athens office.32  The court noted: 
The conduct test does not center its inquiry on whether 
domestic investors or markets are affected, but on the nature of 
the conduct within the United States as it relates to carrying 
out the alleged fraudulent scheme, on the theory that Congress 
did not want ‘to allow the United States to be used as a base for 
manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even 
when these are peddled only to foreigners.’33 
 
28 See id. § 25(a)(1) (2012). 
29 Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 270 (citing 7 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)). 
30 See KALBAUGH, supra note 5, at 451. 
31 722 F.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1983). 
32 Id. at 1044. 
33 Id. at 1045 (quoting ITT v. Vencamp, Ltd. 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975)). 
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Similarly, in Tamari v. Bache & Co. (Lebanon) S.A.L.,34 the 
Seventh Circuit held that the District Court correctly applied the 
conduct and effects test to determine that it had “subject matter 
jurisdiction . . . over a cause of action arising from trading on 
United States exchanges, even though the parties were 
nonresident aliens and contacts between them occurred in a 
foreign country.”35  However, in 2010, one month before Dodd-
Frank’s enactment, the United States Supreme Court decided 
Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.36 and announced a new 
“transactional test” to define the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.37 
2. Morrison and the “Transactional Test” 
In Morrison, the Court held that § 10(b) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (“’34 Exchange Act”) did not have 
extaterritorial reach because there was no affirmative indication 
in the ’34 Exchange Act that this Section should apply 
extraterritorially.38  Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia—
known for his black-and-white textualist methods of 
interpretation—stated that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear 
indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none,”39 giving 
deference to earlier precedent and canons of statutory 
interpretation.40 
However, as importantly noted by Justice Stevens in his 
concurring opinion, “while the clarity and simplicity of [a 
transactional test] may have some salutary consequences, like all 
bright-line rules it also has drawbacks.”41  Primarily, the Court 
did not directly address what happens when a statute includes “a 
 
34 730 F.2d 1103 (7th Cir. 1984). 
35 Id. at 1105–06, 1108; see also Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 
(2d Cir. 1968) (“We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have 
extraterritorial application in order to protect domestic investors who have 
purchased foreign securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic 
securities market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American 
securities.” (emphasis added)). 
36 561 U.S. 247 (2010). 
37 Id. at 274 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
38 Id. at 255 (majority opinion). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. at 255 (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law “that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.” ’ ” (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991))). 
41 Id. at 285 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
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clear statement of extraterritorial effect”42 and conceded that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality is not a “clear statement 
rule” that requires a statute to explicitly say “this law applies 
abroad.”43  As a result, courts have failed to read past the 
straightforward language of the transactional test and have 
begun to erroneously extend Morrison in contexts that a bright-
line test is not suited for, namely in fraud cases that fall under 
the CEA.44 
Most importantly, as highlighted in Part II of this Note, “[a]n 
additional complicating factor is that Morrison was decided 
before Dodd-Frank.”45  Morrison implicitly held that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to all laws that 
are silent on extraterritorial application, and therefore there are 
two clear issues here.  First, the applicability of the transactional 
test outside of § 10(b) is not self-evident, and second, the CEA is 
not silent on extraterritorial application, as explicitly amended 
by Dodd-Frank less than one month after Morrison was decided. 
D. Morrison and Dodd-Frank Fail to Clarify Who May Bring a 
Claim  
In light of essentially overlapping and potentially 
contradictory judicial and legislative activity trying to address 
issues of extraterritorial jurisdiction, it has become increasingly 
unclear what causes of actions U.S. courts have jurisdiction to 
hear based on (1) the type of financial instrument used to 
defraud a purchaser; (2) who is permitted to bring a claim—an 
individual plaintiff exercising a private right of action or only the 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission; (3) the domestic 
versus international nature of the events giving rise to the claim; 
and (4) which test the court should apply in evaluating the claim.  
Despite its attempt to be clear and concise, Morrison has not 
been received as clear, black-letter law governing securities 
claims.  In fact, in the securities regulation and litigation context, 
there have been inconsistent results interpreting and applying 
 
42 Id. at 264–65 (majority opinion) (comparing § 30(a) of the Act with § 10(b), 
§ 30(a) “contains what § 10(b) lacks: a clear statement of extraterritorial 
effect. . . . No one claims that § 30(a) applies here”). 
43 Id. at 265 (“Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”). 
44 See, e.g., Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2014) (discussed infra, Part 
II). 
45 VED P. NANDA ET AL., 2 LITIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES IN U.S. 
COURTS § 8:34 (2d ed. 2017). 
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Morrison, causing confusion and disagreement among courts 
across the nation.46  If courts have not been able to properly use 
the Morrison test in its intended field, it should not come as a 
surprise that this decision has led to widespread confusion in the 
commodities context as well. 
Therefore, this Note proposes a three-part solution.  Part 
III.A argues that courts should return to using a holistic, fact-
specific approach, rather than Morrison’s transactional test, in 
evaluating extraterritorial jurisdiction over derivatives cases.  
Part III.B argues that, consistent with the use of a holistic test 
outlined in Part III.A, foreign plaintiffs should continue to be 
afforded the right to bring a cause of action for derivative fraud 
or manipulation suits in U.S. courts.  Lastly, Part III.C addresses 
the steps that courts must take to correct erroneous 
misstatements to avoid a flawed line of policy and precedent 
moving forward.  However, before turning to these solutions, 
Part II provides in-depth illustration of the problem at hand by 
examining the the Second Circuit decision in Loginovskaya v. 
Batratchenko.  
II. THE MORRISON TEST FALLS SHORT IN A DERIVATIVES 
CONTEXT  
A. The Loginovskaya Decision: The Perfect Storm for 
Extraterritorial Confusion 
In Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko,47 the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that that private fraud 
claims under the CEA may only proceed if the alleged fraudulent  
 
 
46 See In re Vivendi Universal, S.A. Sec. Litig., 765 F. Supp. 2d 512, 527 
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Though the Supreme Court purported to lay out a bright-line rule 
regarding the extraterritorial application of Section 10(b), Morrison's impact on this 
case is far from clear.”); Absolute Activist Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 
F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2012) (“While Morrison holds that § 10(b) can be applied to 
domestic purchases or sales, it provides little guidance as to what constitutes a 
domestic purchase or sale.”); see also Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, 729 F. Supp. 
2d 620, 623–24 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); SEC v. Chicago Convention Ctr., LLC., 961 F. Supp. 
2d 905, 908 (N.D. Ill. 2013). 
47 764 F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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commodities transaction was within the United States, even 
though the defendant corporation was domiciled in the United 
States and the alleged fraud took place in the United States.48 
In Loginovskaya, the Thor Group (“Thor”), “an international 
financial services organization based in New York,” managed 
investment programs in commodity futures and real estate.49  
Several Thor entities were registered participants in the 
commodities markets as commodity pool operators or commodity 
trading investors.50  The defendant, Oleg Batratchenko, a U.S. 
citizen residing in Moscow, was Thor’s chief executive officer, 
while the plaintiff, “[Ludmila] Loginovskaya, a Russian citizen 
residing in Russia, was solicited by Batratchenko in 2006 to 
invest in Thor’s programs.”51  Loginovskaya entered into two 
investment contracts with Thor in 2006 and 2007 and 
transferred a total of $720,000 for these contracts to Thor’s bank 
accounts located in New York.52 
In 2010, Batratchenko sent a letter to Loginovskaya falsely 
stating that “due to onerous new regulations in the United 
States, investors could not withdraw their funds from the 
investment accounts without providing burdensome 
documentation.”53  Loginovskaya later learned that Thor used 
invested client funds to extend $40 million in unsecure loans to 
Atlant Capital Holdings LLC, an undercapitalized real estate 
investment firm in which Batratchenko had personal financial 
interests.54  Ultimately, the loans defaulted and Batratcthenko 
was unable to recover Loginovskaya’s funds.55 
 
 
 
 
48 OWEN C. PELL & SCOTT E. HERSHMAN, WHITE AND CASE, CLIENT ALERT, 
LOGINOVSKAYA V. BATRATCHENKO: THE SECOND CIRCUIT LIMITS THE REACH OF 
COMMODITIES FRAUD CLAIMS 1 (Sept. 2014), http://www.whitecase.com/sites/whiteca 
se/files/files/download/publications/wc-alert-the-second-circuit-limits-the-reach-of-
commodities-fraud-claims.pdf. 
49 Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 268. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 268–69. 
53 Id. at 269. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
FINAL_SCHWARTZ 3/25/2018  7:03 PM 
780 ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 91:769   
Loginovskaya sued under CEA § 25, which provides a 
plaintiff with a private cause of action under the Act,56 and § 4o, 
one of the CEA’s several antifraud provisions.57  The Southern 
District dismissed Loginovskaya’s claim, extending Morrison to 
CEA claims and held that the CEA’s antifraud provision did not 
apply extraterritorially.58 
On appeal, the Second Circuit agreed with the Southern 
District.59  In reaching its decision, the court stated that “[t]he 
CEA as a whole—and sections 4o and 22 in particular—is silent 
as to extraterritorial reach,” and therefore applied Morrison’s 
presumption against extraterritoriality.60  The court reasoned 
that “the CEA creates a private right of action for persons 
anywhere in the world who transact business in the United 
States, and does not open our courts to people who choose to do 
business elsewhere.”61  The court stopped its analysis at § 22 and 
did not proceed to analyze Loginovskaya’s § 4o claim. 
In a vigorous and well-executed dissent, Judge Lohier 
argued that Loginovskaya sufficiently alleged a violation of and 
satisfied the territoriality requirement under § 4o and identified 
several inconsistencies in the majority’s analysis.62  In part, he 
states: 
In other words, had Loginovskaya resided on Main Street, 
U.S.A. or Sutton Place, New York rather than in Surgut, Russia 
at the time she made her investments, we all agree that her suit 
would have been allowed to proceed: a large part of the 
defendants’ scheme transpired in the United States, involved 
United States actors regulated by the CEA, and was premised 
on false promises to invest Loginovskaya’s money in 
commodities markets in the United States, in violation of 
§ 4o. . . . Instead, the majority opinion affords an extra, 
 
56 See 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1) (2012). 
57 Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko (Loginovskaya I), 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 363 
(S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
58 Id. at 366 (“[I]n order for the CEA to be applicable, the implicated fraud 
prohibited by the statute must be domestic. In a post-Morrison universe, however, 
determining whether actionable conduct falling within a given statute is domestic in 
nature presents complications for provisions whose language departs from that of 
§ 10(b).”). 
59 Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 275. 
60 Id. at 271.  
61 Id. at 273. In the wake of the Loginovskaya II decision, the CFTC asserted 
that this statement, given Dodd-Frank’s changed to the CEA, is factually incorrect. 
See infra note 68. 
62 Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 276 (Lohier, J., dissenting). 
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unfounded layer of protection to the defendants by applying the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and the Morrison 
transaction test to § 22 of the CEA . . . .  Under the rule 
announced today, private victims of commodities fraud will be 
required to allege a separate domestic commodities transaction 
even if they adequately plead a violation of § 4o, which does not 
require such a transaction.  In fashioning this new rule, the 
majority misunderstands both the commodities laws of the 
United States and the presumption of extraterritoriality.63 
Additionally, Judge Lohier explained why Morrison’s 
transaction test does not apply to § 4o and, most importantly, 
reflected on the purpose and intent of the CEA: to “ ‘protect all 
market participants from fraudulent or other abusive sales 
practices and misuses of customer assets’ and to preserve the 
integrity of the United States commodities markets.”64 
As highlighted by Judge Lohier, there are two major 
problems with the court’s Loginovskaya analysis.  First, as noted 
by the Southern District and the dissent in this case, it is not 
entirely clear that the Supreme Court intended Morrison to 
apply outside of the securities context, let alone to commodity 
claims.65  Second, the court chose to apply Morrison after 
interpreting the CEA to be silent with regard to 
extraterritoriality.66  However, as the text of the CEA has read 
since July 2010, this is not the case: § 2(i) discusses the 
extraterritorial application of the Act.67 
 
 
 
 
 
63 Id. at 276–77; see also id. at 279 (“I share the majority’s optimism that the 
CFTC can effectively police bad behavior. Having announced, however, that ‘the 
CEA creates a private right of action for persons anywhere in the world who 
transact business in the United States, and does not open our courts to people who 
choose to do business elsewhere,’ the majority cannot have it both ways.” (citation 
omitted)). 
64 Id. at 280 (emphasis in original) (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 5 (2012)). 
65 Loginovskaya I, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). (“[T]he 
appropriateness of extending Morrison’s transaction test to CEA claims under § 4o is 
not immediately clear.”). 
66 See supra note 60. 
67 7 U.S.C.A § 2(i)(1)–(2) (West 2015). 
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B. The CFTC Rejects the Second Circuit’s Reading of the CEA 
Days after the Loginovskaya opinion was published, the 
CFTC wrote to the Second Circuit requesting the correction of 
“certain erroneous statements about the CEA.”68  Specifically, the 
CFTC wrote, “the Court stated incorrectly that the CEA is ‘silent’ 
with respect to its extraterritorial application” in Section II of the 
majority opinion.69  The CFTC continued, “[b]ased on the facts as 
described in the opinion, it appears that the Court intended to 
address the CEA as it existed prior to July 2010 . . . when 
Congress overhauled the statute in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.”70  In contrast, “when 
Congress amended the CEA in Dodd-Frank, it specified that the 
CEA does apply overseas to swaps activity with a sufficient 
nexus to U.S. commerce” and therefore, because “the private 
right of action provision under CEA Section 22, 7 U.S.C. § 25, 
was amended by Dodd-Frank to include references to swaps 
activities, [it is] covered by Section 2(i),” and the court’s 
“statement that the CEA is ‘silent as to extraterritorial reach’ 
and related statements on the intent of Congress 
are . . . incorrect.”71 
The CFTC concluded by requesting that the Court amend its 
opinion to clarify which version of the CEA it is referring to for 
the relevant time period in question.72  Most importantly, the 
CFTC’s letter addressed the heart of its issue with the Second 
Circuit’s incorrect application of the law: 
Given the Second Circuit’s preeminence in the field of financial 
regulation, the error regarding the CEA’s current overseas 
applicability may be cited by other courts and litigants to create 
a flawed line of precedent that could hamper the Commission’s 
enforcement and regulatory efforts in the future, [and] [a]t a 
minimum, this incorrect language is likely to sow confusion.73 
Despite the CFTC’s efforts, the Loginovskaya opinion 
remains unchanged. 
 
 
68 Letter on behalf of the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, requesting 
a change to be made to the Opinion Filed at 1, Loginovskaya v. Batratchenko, 764 
F.3d 266 (2d Cir. 2014) (No. 13-01624) 2014 BL 245952. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. (internal citations omitted). 
71 Id. at 2.  
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 3. 
FINAL _SCHWARTZ 3/25/2018  7:03 PM 
2017] ‘DERIVING’ AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE CEA 783 
C. Loginovskaya’s Lingering Effects Reveal Inconsistent Case 
Law Across the Country  
The CFTC accurately predicted that the Second Circuit’s 
failure to correct the statements in its opinion would create a 
flawed line of precedent.  Since 2014, many opinions that have 
come out of the Southern District of New York have relied on the 
Court’s analysis in Loginovskaya to interpret the CEA and, in 
several cases, have led the Court to conclude that the Act does 
not have extraterritorial reach.74 
However, the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Florida recently accepted the opposing argument.  In 
US Commodity Futures Exchange Commission v. Vision 
Financial Partners, LLC,75 the defendant, Vision Financial, 
operating from Florida, recruited individuals to invest in binary 
options traded through three foreign platforms: one located in 
Israel, one located in Cyprus, and one located in the United 
Kingdom.76  Vision Financial did not invest the majority of the 
funds received; instead, its key director, Neil Pecker, used these 
funds to pay for his personal expenses.77  The defendant claimed 
that the CEA “does not extend the Commission’s authority to 
binary options” and that the court would lack jurisdiction over 
such a matter “because [the options] were purchased by foreign 
investors and exchanged on foreign trading platforms.”78  The 
 
74 See, e.g., MBC Fin. Servs. v. Boston Merch. Fin, LLC, 15-cv-00275 (DAB), 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140195, at *29 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 4, 2016) (holding that the 
plaintiff’s CEA claim could not survive a motion to dismiss because the “[p]laintiff 
[did] not demonstrate that any title of a commodity or swap was transferred within 
the United States, or that either party incurred irrevocable liability within the 
United States to pay or deliver a swap”); In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates 
Antitrust Litig., 13 Civ. 7789 (LGS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128237, at *93 (S.D.N.Y. 
Sept. 20, 2016) (determining that the CEA does not apply extraterritorially to 
foreign exchange claims because “[i]n Loginovskaya, the Second Circuit held that 
because ‘the CEA as a whole is silent as to extraterritorial reach,’ courts must 
‘presume it is primarily concerned with domestic conditions’ ” (internal alterations 
omitted) (quoting Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266, 270 (2d Cir. 2014))); Sullivan v. 
Barclays Plc, 13-cv-2811 (PKC), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25756, at *87–88 (S.D.N.Y. 
Feb. 21, 2017); In re Platinum and Palladium Antitrust Litig., 1:14-cv-9391-GHW, 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46624, at *84–87 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2017); Wah v. HSBC N. 
Am. Holdings, Inc., 15 Civ. 8974 (LGS) 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86107, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. 
June 5, 2017); In re North Sea Brent Crude Oil Futures Litig., 13-md-02475 (ALC), 
2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88246, at *26–28 (S.D.N.Y. June 8, 2017). 
75 190 F. Supp. 3d 1126 (S.D. Fla. 2016). 
76 Id. at 1128. 
77 Id. at 1129. 
78 Id. at 1130. 
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court declined to accept either of these arguments, and stated 
that “[t]he Commodity Exchange Act . . . does contain an 
affirmative indication that it applies to extraterritorial 
transactions . . . .”79 
There are two key differences between Loginovskaya and 
Vision Financial that those in support of the Loginovskaya 
decision might point out.  First, Loginovskaya deals with a 
plaintiff seeking to exercise a private right of action, whereas 
Vision Financial deals with the Commission bringing a suit.80  
Morrison is designed to limit the former, not the latter, and 
§ 13a-1 explicitly grants jurisdiction to the Commission to sue for 
a “violation of any provision of [the Commodity Exchange Act].”81  
Second, in Loginovskaya, the victim was defrauded through 
investment in a swap, whereas in Vision Financial, the victims 
were defrauded through investment in binary options.82  While it 
may seem that either of these differences could be a “smoking 
gun” to solidify a motion to dismiss, this is not the case. 
Using a factually-focused, holistic approach, partnered with 
a close reading of the post-Dodd-Frank CEA, it is evident that 
despite the cross-border nature of the facts, both Loginovskaya 
and the CFTC should be permitted to assert their claims.  The 
same way that § 13a-1 permits the CFTC to assert a claim with 
regard to any violation of the Act, including instruments 
commonly known to the trade such as binary options, § 22 and 
§ (2)(i), read together, should permit Ludmila Loginovskaya to 
assert her claim for fraudulent swap activity.83 
Therefore, to ensure consistency, predictability, and stability 
within the law and international commodity markets, three 
different things need to happen.  First, courts need to return to a 
holistic approach in evaluating extraterritorial claims that are 
subject to the CEA.  Second, using this holistic approach, courts 
 
79 Id. at 1131 (emphasis in original). 
80 Compare Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d 266, 268 (2d Cir. 2013), with Vision 
Financial, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1127. 
81 See Vision Financial, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 1129; see also 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 
(2012). 
82 Compare Loginovskaya II, 764 F.3d at 268–69, with Vision Financial, 190 F. 
Supp. 3d at 1128. 
83 See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1 (2012) (“[T]he Commission may bring an action . . . to 
enforce compliance with this chapter, or any rule, regulation or order thereunder, 
and said courts shall have jurisdiction to entertain such actions.”); see also 
7 U.S.C. § 25(c) (2012) (extending private rights of action in options in various 
financial contracts, including swaps). 
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need to give the Dodd-Frank amendments to the CEA their full 
effect and permit individual plaintiffs to assert private rights of 
action in court.  Finally, the Second Circuit needs to address the 
shortcomings of the Loginovskaya decision to curtail further 
confusion. 
III. REVIVING A HOLISTIC APPROACH TO INTERPRETING 
EXTRATERRITORIAL CLAIMS ASSERTED UNDER THE CEA 
A. Courts Should Not Extend Morrison in the Commodities and 
Derivatives Context 
Although securities law analyses have often been 
analogously extended to commodity claims in the past,84 
Morrison’s transactional test and presumptions against 
extraterritoriality should not be extended to commodity claims, 
and courts should return to a more holistic analysis in 
determining whether a court has jurisdiction over a claim.  This 
idea has been alluded to in several instances, including by the 
Southern District in the initial Loginovskaya decision,85 and by 
the concurring justices in the Morrison decision. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg, focused on the importance of a flexible method and 
argued that “while the Court devotes a considerable amount of 
attention to the development of case law . . . it draws the wrong 
conclusions [here].”86  “The text and history of § 10(b) are 
famously opaque on the question of when, exactly, transnational 
securities frauds fall within the statute’s compass.”87  Therefore, 
while Scalia’s bright-line rule “makes for a nice catchphrase, the 
point is overstated.”88  Best stated, “[t]he presumption against 
 
84 See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1044 (2d Cir. 1983) (“In 
construing the reaches of jurisdiction under the CEA, courts have analogized to 
similar problems under the securities laws which have been more extensively 
litigated.”). Note that this was at the time of courts using the “conducts” and 
“effects” test, which is more appropriately suited for a commodities claim analysis. 
85 Loginovskaya I, 936 F. Supp. 2d 357, 368 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
86 Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 278 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring); id. at 278–79 (“[T]he Court seeks to transform the presumption from a 
flexible rule of thumb into something more like a clear statement rule. . . .”). 
87 Id. at 274; id. at 276 (“[T]he Court’s critique of the decision below for applying 
‘judge-made rules’ is quite misplaced [because] [t]his entire area of law is replete 
with judge-made rules, which give concrete meaning to Congress’ general 
commands.”). 
88 Id. at 280. 
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extraterritoriality can be useful as a theory of congressional 
purpose, a tool for managing international conflict, a background 
norm, a tie breaker.  It does not relieve courts of their duty to 
give statutes the most faithful reading possible.”89  The Court’s 
real question in Morrison was addressing “how much, and what 
kinds, of domestic contacts were sufficient to trigger the 
application of § 10(b)” of the Exchange Act, and that is where 
Morrison’s application should end.90 
While there certainly are critical underlying differences 
between securities and derivative products, the regulatory 
regimes governing each, especially following the enactment of 
Dodd-Frank, are quite similar.91  Dodd-Frank amended the 
language of both the CEA as well as the ’34 Exchange Act.92  The 
language in both of the acts has led to a widespread divide 
among courts in interpreting how Morrison should now apply, 
but it seems clear that Congress included this language in both of 
the acts to clarify the reach of Dodd-Frank and address its 
disagreement with the Morrison Court.93 
Under the amended language of the ’34 Exchange Act, 
Morrison should be less relevant in the securities context than it 
still is, as it was meant to be overridden by the statutory 
language.  Courts have long understood the importance of 
plaintiffs being able to bring a private right of action,94 and over 
time, it seems that courts have begun to experience and 
understand the post-Dodd-Frank challenges associated with 
using the Morrison test.95  
 
89 Id.; id. at 285 (“[W]hile the clarity and simplicity of the Court’s test may have 
some salutary consequences, like all bright-line rules it also has its drawbacks.”). 
90 Id. at 281. 
91 See Wall Street Transparency and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1672 (2010). 
92 Id. 
93 Jonathan E. Richman, Proskauer Rose Discusses the SEC’s Extraterritorial 
Reach, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (Apr. 11, 2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu 
/2017/04/11/proskauer-rose-discusses-the-secs-extraterritorial-reach/ (“The Morrison 
decision was announced on June 24, 2010. On July 21, 2010—less than one month 
later—President Obama signed the 850-page Dodd-Frank Act . . . .”) 
94 See Tellabs Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007) 
(“This Court has long recognized that meritorious private actions to enforce federal 
antifraud securities laws are an essential supplement to criminal prosecutions and 
civil enforcement actions brought, respectively, by the Department of Justice and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”). 
95 See supra note 46.  
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Therefore, because of the intended effect of the Dodd-Frank 
amendments to the CEA and the ’34 Exchange Act and the fact 
that the Morrison test cannot be consistently applied and used in 
its intended securities context,96 it should follow that the test 
cannot be consistently applied and should not be used in the 
commodities and derivatives context. 
B. The Importance of Affording Foreign Plaintiffs a Private 
Right of Action 
Dodd-Frank unwound the broad exemption from OTC 
derivatives regulation provided by the Commodity Futures 
Modernization Act and substituted a complex regulatory 
framework by dividing the market into “swaps” to be primarily 
regulated by the CFTC, and “security-based swaps” to be 
primarily regulated by the SEC, and “mixed swaps.”97  The 
definition of “swap” is not exactly straightforward.98  Due to the 
complexity and diversity of swaps and other derivatives, it is 
easy to see how fraud, though not physically taking place on U.S. 
soil, could easily disrupt the domestic and international markets.  
This volatility, partnered with the sheer size of the industry 
alone, is a leading reason why § 22 of the CEA exists and why we 
should allow plaintiffs to exercise private rights in situations 
where they may have been defrauded.  While critics may argue 
that permitting foreign plaintiffs to gain access to U.S. courts 
will open litigation floodgates and overwhelm the court system, 
when balancing the interests of preserving an interdependent 
system, this interest should outweigh procedural hurdles. 
Similar balancing and interdependent policy arguments can 
be seen outside of the derivatives context in bankruptcy cases.  
For example, § 109(a) of the United States Bankruptcy Code 
articulates that in order to be eligible to file in the United States, 
the debtor must either be domiciled, have a place of business, or 
property in the United States.99  Foreign debtors that are neither 
domiciled nor operate a business in the United States are 
permitted to file and reap the benefits of the United States’ 
 
96 See supra note 46. 
97 See KALBAUGH, supra note 5, at 71–72, 78–89 . 
98 See id. at 73 (fig.3-B: Swap Definition); see also Commodity Exchange Act, 
7 U.S.C. § 1a(47) (2012); Memorandum from Willkie Farr & Gallagher LLP to 
Clients, supra note 8. 
99 11 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
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system, even where their property in the United States is 
something as minimal as $194 in a bank account.100  Similarly, 
Bankruptcy Courts have attempted to extend the Morrison test 
to bankruptcy claims and, like in commodity cases, reached 
inconsistent decisions on the Code’s extraterritorial 
applicability.101  This Note does not suggest that commodity fraud 
claims should be treated like bankruptcy cases, but rather that 
other legal contexts allow foreign plaintiffs to assert claims in 
U.S. courts for the overall benefit of the system and these same 
policy rationales should be considered in this context. 
In addition to this practical policy argument, it would be 
highly inefficient to narrowly constrain a plaintiff’s ability to 
bring a private right of action under the CEA.  In lieu of allowing 
potentially wronged plaintiffs to exercise, and likely settle, their 
claims with a commodity broker, this would require that 
enforcement gap to be filled by the CFTC—an already 
underfunded and overstretched agency. 
As noted by the CFTC Chairman, Timothy Massad, in light 
of Dodd-Frank’s changes, “the CFTC’s budget has not kept pace 
with its expanded role and market growth.”102  “The traditional 
markets overseen by the Commission—that is, the futures and 
options markets—are vastly different today than when the 
Commission was established 40 years ago or even five years ago.  
They have grown dramatically in size, technological 
sophistication and complexity.”103  To understand the full scope of 
its jurisdiction, consider the following from the 2015 Strategic 
Plan: 
 
 
100 See In re Global Ocean Carriers Ltd., 251 B.R. 31, 38 (Bankr. De. 2000) 
(citing In re McTague, 198 B.R. 428, 429 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1996)) (holding that the 
debtor corporation, headquartered in Athens, Greece, was eligible to file bankruptcy 
in the United States because it had funds in a bank account here). 
101 Compare In re Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 480 B.R. 501, 506 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
2012) (concluding that Congress expressed a clear intention that § 550 of the 
Bankruptcy Code should apply extraterritorially), with In re Madoff Sec., 513 B.R. 
222, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Nothing in [the] language [of § 550] suggest[ed] that 
Congress intended for this section to apply for foreign transfers,” and that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality had not been rebutted). 
102 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: FISCAL 
YEAR 2017, supra note 23. Similarly, the SEC has not kept pace with its expanded 
role and is only about halfway through with its mandated rulemaking. 
103 Id. at 2. 
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[T]he CFTC regulates a futures and options industry that 
increased from 580 million contracts in 2000 to more than 3.1 
billion contracts in 2010.  The value of customer funds held in 
Futures Commission Merchants Accounts, during the same 
period, increased from $56.7 billion to more than $170.1 billion, 
and the value of these contracts is notionally estimated at $40 
trillion. . . . [W]ith the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act, the 
CFTC is [now] tasked with regulating the swaps markets with 
an estimated notional value of approximately $300 trillion—
roughly eight times the size of the regulated futures markets.104 
Though there have been increases to the CFTC’s budget over 
time, these increases have not sufficiently helped the agency 
carry out its expanded responsibilities.105  In fact, the CFTC’s 
budget did not increase from 2015 to 2016.106  As a result of these 
inevitable constraints, one of the biggest drawbacks noted by the 
Commission is the crux of this argument: “The Commission 
cannot engage in the necessary level of market surveillance, risk 
surveillance and oversight, and enforcement efforts.  This places 
customers, the market, and by extension the U.S. economy at 
increased risk of fraud, abusive practices and manipulation.”107 
Given these limitations and the scope of the market it 
regulates, limiting private rights of action afforded under the 
CEA would only increase the overall burden on the CFTC and 
work counterintuitively against this goal.  An aggrieved plaintiff 
will always have the option of bringing its allegations to and 
seeking a remedy through the Commission,108 but to make this 
their sole option for recovery would undercut the mission of both 
the Commission and the CEA itself. 
Courts have generally affirmed the CFTC’s power to engage 
in rulemaking under Title VII and determine the extraterritorial 
scope of those rules,109 and the Commission itself has also 
recognized the need for private rights of action to supplement its 
 
104 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, STRATEGIC PLAN FY 2011–
2015, at 6 (2011), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public/@aboutcftc/documents/file/20 
15strategicplan.pdf (emphasis added). 
105 U.S. COMMODITY FUTURES TRADING COMM’N, PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: FISCAL 
YEAR 2017, supra note 23, at 4. 
106 Id. at 10 tbl.1. 
107 Id. at 3. 
108 See 7 U.S.C. § 13a-1(a)–(c) (2012); 7 U.S.C. § 18(a)(1) (2012). 
109 See Sec. Indus. & Fin. Markets Ass'n v. U.S. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n, 67 F. Supp. 3d 373, 384 (D.D.C. 2014). 
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jurisdiction to support its mission.110  Considering all of these 
factors, courts should permit plaintiffs to exercise private rights 
of action in U.S. courts to preserve the integrity of the 
international derivatives markets and to give both the CEA and 
Dodd-Frank their full effect. 
C. Clarifying Loginovskaya Will Help Preserve Market Integrity  
The last step in untangling the web of extraterritorial 
confusion is determining how to correct previous missteps of the 
court. The CFTC advised the Second Circuit that its opinion in 
Loginovskaya, if not corrected, would likely sow confusion.111  
However, a simple timeline breakdown may reveal a way for the 
decision to make sense in an isolated circumstance. 
The fraud in Loginovskaya took place between 2006 and 
2010, Morrison was decided in June 2010, and Dodd-Frank, 
amending the relevant provisions of the CEA addressed in the 
decision, was enacted in July 2010.  If the Second Circuit’s 
statement and analysis meant that the CEA did not apply 
extraterritorially at the time of the fraud, the court needed to 
make that assumption explicitly clear.  By making these unclear 
statements in its July 2014 decision, other courts have taken the 
Second Circuit’s statements at face value.  This unclear language 
will not only continue to confuse courts, but will also continue to 
confuse future plaintiffs trying to determine whether they can 
assert a claim under the CEA in a U.S. court, ultimately blocking 
their access to the court system and barring them from bringing 
legitimate claims.  Therefore, this error should be remedied, at a 
 
110 “Private rights of action have been instrumental in helping to protect market 
participants and deter bad actors. These actions can also augment the limited 
enforcement resources of the CFTC, and serve the public interest by allowing 
harmed parties to seek damages in instances where the Commission lacks the 
resources to do so on their behalf.” Timothy Massad, Chairman, Commodity Futures 
Trading Comm’n, Statement in Support of the Proposed Amendment to the RTO-
ISO Order (May 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ 
massadstatement051016 (advocating for the Commission’s proposal to expressly 
preserve the right of private litigants to sue utilities, power producers, marketers 
and other market participants for fraud and manipulation resulting from certain 
transactions); J. Christopher Giancarlo, Commissioner, Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm’n, Statement of Dissent on the Proposed Amendment to the RTO-ISO Order 
(May 10, 2016), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/giancarlostate 
ment051016 (disagreeing with the proposal but conceding that “private claims may 
serve the public interest by empowering injured parties to seek compensation for 
damages where the Commission lacks the resources to do so on their behalf”).  
111 See supra note 73. 
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minimum, by amending the opinion to specify that the Court 
considered the language of the CEA as it existed during the 
relevant pre-Dodd-Frank fraud period in the facts of the case.112 
Congress’s intent of protecting both markets and individuals 
has been recognized through the enactment of Dodd-Frank and 
the amending of the CEA.  This intent has been echoed by both 
the SEC and the CFTC and is consistent with the agencies’ 
rulemaking and governance.  It is important that courts 
accurately interpret and reflect these goals and the appropriate 
statutory mechanisms to achieve them. 
CONCLUSION 
If Ludmila Loginovskaya was defrauded by Thor Entities 
tomorrow, and the Second Circuit correctly interpreted the 
language of the CEA in a post-Dodd-Frank world, the difference 
of her residing on Main Street, U.S.A. or Sutton Place, New York, 
rather than in Surgut, Russia would have been immaterial.  She 
would have had her day in court.  “[P]rivate rights of action were 
called for by Congress under the CEA, to ensure wronged parties 
were provided with an appropriate remedy . . . . Our job is to 
ensure that determination is properly implemented and 
enforced.”113   
By eliminating the use of the Morrison test and returning to 
a holistic, fact-specific approach in assessing extraterritorial 
commodity claims, both private plaintiffs, foreign and domestic, 
and the CFTC will be permitted to bring a cause of action for 
commodities fraud under the CEA.  More specifically, permitting 
foreign plaintiffs to bring private causes of action in the United 
States will allow for all three branches of government to work 
towards the common goal of preserving the integrity of both the 
domestic and international derivatives markets, and the 
individuals who seek to participate in those markets. 
 
112 See supra note 68. 
113 Massad, supra note 110. 
